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each corner of my life which is unforgettable. 
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quick feed back, motivating me, and on the top his smile, surely I learned a lot from my master 
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things from Willy Røed,  
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work; finally, lots of thanks are due to my friend Suleman khan, who motivated me through out 
my thesis. 
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Summary 
 
In this master thesis, the effects of changing the test interval of the land based safety 
critical valves have been highlighted. Compliance with the regulations given by the 
PSAN (Petroleum Safety Authority Norway) requires annual testing of these valves. 
The testing of safety critical valves are essential to increase the probability that the 
valves are able to conduct intended functions, and beneficial to improve safety and 
regularity. Moreover, "Too often" testing can lead to unnecessary production loss, with 
major economic consequences, and the danger/risk of test-induced errors. "Too less" 
testing can lead to the valves failure, which in a result could have major consequences 
in relation to safety and long downtime during repairs.  
There are a number of test methods (differential pressure test, partial stroke testing etc.) 
used  for different  safety critical valves, because Valve design, the consequences of 
downtime, environmental aspects of the testing, etc. varies between different safety 
critical valves. The choice of inappropriate test regimes can lead to unnecessary 
downtime and environmental emissions in testing. Thus these different test methods 
have great influence on the effects of changing the test interval of the safety critical 
valves. 
It is not simple and easy to clarify and conclude, which case of changing the test interval 
is more appropriate in connection with all the effects related to the change of test 
interval of these valves. As there are many factors (degradation mechanism, failure 
modes, testing methods, regularity, production effects) which needs to be deeply 
analyzed and evaluated for future research. 
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Abbreviations 
 
• NPD   Norwegian Petroleum Directorate 
• ESD   Emergency Shut-Down 
• ESDV   Emergency Shut-Down valve 
• SCV   Safety Critical Valve 
• PSD   Process Shut Down 
• PSAN   Petroleum Safety Authority Norway  
• PA    Production Assurance  
• PSA    Probabilistic Safety Assessment 
• CORD  Coordinated operation and maintenance offshore 
• NCS   Norwegian continental Shelf 
• SIS   Safety Instrumented Systems 
• MMS   Maintenance Management System 
• RCM   Reliability Centred Maintenance 
• RBI   Risk Based Inspection 
• TPM   Team Productivity Management 
• PM   Planned Maintenance 
• PLM   Planned Lifetime Management 
• LCC   Life Cycle Cost 
• OEE   Overall Equipment Effectiveness 
• OLF    Norwegian Oil Industry Association 
• IEC   International Electrotechnical Commission 
• ISO   International Organization for Standardization 
• CMMS  Computerized Maintenance Management System 
• SAP   System Applications and Products 
• RNNS   Risikonivå på norsk sokkel  
• OREDA  Offshore Reliability Data  
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Definitions 
 
Production assurance: Also referred to as regularity, is a term used to describe how 
capable a system is to meet demand for deliveries or performance [35]. 
Availability: The ability of an item to be in a state to perform a required function under 
given conditions at a given instant of time or during a given time interval assuming that 
the required external resources are provided. 
Production Availability: The ratio of production to planned production, or any other 
reference level, over a specified period of time [35]. 
Risk:  Risk is defined as combination of possible consequences and associated 
uncertainties (quantified by probabilities)’’ [2]. 
Uncertainty: Lack of knowledge about the performance of a system (the ‘World’), and 
observable quantities in particular 
Failure: Termination of the ability of an item to perform a required function. 
Note 1: After failure the item has a fault. 
Note 2: “Failure” is an event, as distinguished from “fault”, which is a state. 
 
Failure mechanism: The physical, chemical or other processes which lead or have led 
to a failure. 
 
Failure mode: The effect by which a failure is observed on the failed item. 
 
Safety system:  A system which realises one or more active safety functions [27]. 
Safety functions:  Physical measures which reduce the probability of a situation of 
hazard and accident occurring, or which limit the consequences of an accident [27].  
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1. Introduction  
 
In [27], §7 of the Activities Regulations it is stated that Facilities shall be equipped with 
necessary safety functions which at all times are able to:                                                                                                                             
a)  Detect abnormal conditions 
b)  Prevent abnormal conditions from developing into situations of hazard and accident,  
c)  Limit harm in the event of accidents 
Moreover, facilities shall have an emergency shutdown system, e.g. safety critical valve, 
which would be able to prevent situations of hazard and accident from developing and 
to limit the consequences of accidents, on safety functions. This system shall be able to 
perform the intended functions independently of other systems.    
According to PSAN (Petroleum Safety Authorities Norway) ‘‘requirements for testing of 
safety critical valves’’ emphasizes that there should be annual testing of all safety 
critical valves and  intervals for verification have to be established based on; 
requirements to reliability, knowledge about failure conditions, knowledge about 
possible consequences from failure conditions, and knowledge about valve 
characteristics [7]. 
In testing of safety critical valves means that production must be shut down, the valve 
must be closed, pressure downstream the valve is bled off, and pressure build-up is 
measured. 
It has been observed that often these tests are carried out during turnarounds, not 
influencing production downtime, even though test are labour intensive, costs related to 
such test are limited but sometimes the situation is different. Some oil and gas plants do 
not perform turnarounds each year and production may have to be shut down for hours 
because of these tests. In most cases these shut downs are also affecting other 
installations. This is of course an expensive operation that the operators want to limit to 
what is needed to maintain the required safety level; not only because of the loss of 
production and loss of income, but also because a shut down of the process and 
manual intervention into the hydrocarbon system has a negative effect on the safety 
level in it self (PSAN, 2004) [7]. 
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 For instance, if we focus on the barrier functions of the valves, and if we prove the 
same safety level with alternative test procedures or risk reducing measures then we 
could be able to justify an increase of test intervals of safety critical valves; [7]  
 
1.1 Background  
 
Modern production systems are large, complex, automated, and integrated. Failures 
occur more or less frequently in these complex and large systems. For a production 
plant, the consequences of failure include high maintenance cost, possible loss of 
production, and exposure to accidents. It can also lead to annoyance, inconvenience 
and a lasting customer dissatisfaction that can play havoc with the responsible 
company’s marketplace position [16]. So, it is important for the plant engineers and 
managers to make decisions that can reduce or eliminate the probability of failures 
or/and their consequences as well as uncertainties in production processes to get better 
production assurance. 
Production Assurance (PA) is introduced by the Norwegian oil and gas industry, which 
plays a significant role in supporting the decision-making process for managers and 
engineers dealing with the challenges of meeting various customer requirements as well 
as production control needs. Therefore, there has recently been a high degree of 
interest in use of the production assurance concept [15].  
Production assurance (also referred to as regularity) is a term used to describe how 
capable a system is to meet demand for deliveries or performance [35]. Production 
assurance may be quantified by various measures like production availability, 
throughput capacity, deliverability, or demand availability. The PA concept includes 
several other concepts, such as reliability, maintainability, availability, and maintenance 
support performance. Some of these concepts, and their relationships, are illustrated in 
figure 1. In the following section, different concepts, of production assurance are briefly 
reviewed and discussed. 
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            Figure 1, Relationship between production assurance terms [35]     
Effective maintenance is necessary to ensure the reliability of plant/equipment. If 
equipment is unreliable, the profitability of a business can be greatly decreased. 
Therefore, the benefits of employing the efficient maintenance strategies cannot be 
underestimated.  
Effective equipment maintenance ultimately dictates plant reliability and has great 
impact on the success and profitability of a business unit. There is an increasing 
industry focus on safety, risk avoidance and environmental awareness, which 
emphasises the importance of avoiding failure through successful maintenance. As a 
consequence, maintenance practices often account for an overwhelming percentage of 
budget expenditure. The financial and safety benefits of employing efficient and 
effective maintenance strategies for equipment cannot be underestimated.  
The Norwegian safety regulations have two kinds of requirements related to 
maintenance: 
1. High level requirements stating that installations, systems and equipment should 
be maintained in a prudent manner. 
2. Detailed and prescriptive requirements for a system or a piece of equipment to 
be tested or inspected at certain intervals [22]. 
 
Testing and maintenance of the valves is carried out in accordance with the 
maintenance programme to increase the probability that the valves are going to fulfil 
their intended functions. Moreover, the testing of safety critical valves are essential 
because it contributes to improve safety. Therefore, we wish to test these valves "often 
enough", but not "too often", but what is often enough? This is the one question, which 
is concerned by both authorities and different players in the current industry. 
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1.2  Thesis objective/Problem Statement 
 
This thesis is a part of RAMONA project which focuses on regularity and deliverability of 
the Norwegian gas transport system.  
In production plants, generally incidents and events occur from both safety-related and 
technical integrity-related concerns. “Safety integrity related incidents are those 
endangering harm to people. Working without Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), 
personal injuries, and fire and explosions are some of the examples that come under 
safety integrity-related incidents. Technical integrity-related incidents on the other hand,  
refers to a wide area of technical incidents arising from day to day operations, and those 
resulting in the possible reduction or loss of daily production’’; see  [17]  
The main objective of this thesis is to ‘‘discuss the effects of changing the test 
interval of land based safety critical valves in hydrocarbons transport systems’’. 
Changing test interval means increase or decrease of the interval period compare to 
current standard test interval (which is one year) followed by industry. 
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1.3  Contents Of Report 
 
This master thesis consists of seven (7) chapters, in chapter 1, an introduction and 
background information related to the topic has discussed, and then main problem 
statement of the thesis has been explained. 
The purpose of chapter 2 is to give basic theoretical concepts related to societal safety, 
risk, risk analysis and risk management including different decision making tools and 
their pros and cons will be discussed and explained. 
Chapter 3 talks about different laws, regulations, standards, guidelines about Risk 
management, maintenance management, barrier systems, and specifically safety 
critical components and their maintenance will be discussed. 
First part of chapter 4 will give a discussion about basics of valve, valve types and 
characteristics, performance and pros and cons of these valves. In the 2nd part of this 
chapter, explains why we need to test valves, different failure mechanisms, failure 
modes have discussed. In the last part, safety critical valves have been discussed with 
their testing methods, functions, intervals, etc. 
Chapter 5, first discusses industry challenges in connection with changing of test 
interval of land-based safety critical valves and second part elaborates the effects or 
consequences of changing the test interval of safety critical valves and discussed with 
different dilemmas in section 5.3  
In chapter 6, a case study is described, which is based upon chapter 4 and chapter 5 of 
this report. This case study is about one land-based gas process plant, among others, 
regularity of production and equipment is main objective of the operator, moreover, 
safety critical valves have been used as en emergency shutdown valve (ESDV) in this 
case study. The main theme is to discuss effects of changing the test interval of the 
safety critical valves used in this processing plant. 
Lastly, chapter 7 will summarise the whole discussion of this report and makes some 
fine conclusions.   
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2. Risk Management 
 
In this chapter, firstly societal safety is defined and then there are some concepts which 
needs to bee understood for having good picture of Risk management has been 
discussed. 
2.1  Societal Safety 
As a student of Master program in ‘‘Societal safety’’, It is first necessary to briefly 
discuss about societal safety .According to [24], it is defined as: 
“The ability society has to maintain critical societal functions, protect the life and 
health of the citizens and meet their basic requirements in a variety of stress 
situations”  
Societal safety is a systematic process of applying scientific principles in dealing with 
threats, dangers, risk, losses and other dynamic side effects of modern society. 
One can say that the state is a key actor and ultimately responsible for the societal 
safety. In addition, the state needs ability to establish and maintain public confidence in 
critical social institutions and finally the state build mutual trust among different groups 
within the population. 
                       
2.2  Risk Analysis  
Risk can be defined as ’combination of possible consequences and associated 
uncertainties (quantified by probabilities)’’ [2]                                                                      
Similarly another way of defining risk can be a combination of the probability of 
occurrence of harm and the severity of that harm. Risk may be expressed qualitatively 
as well as quantitatively.  
The definition implies that risk aversion (i.e. an evaluation of risk which places more 
importance on certain accidental consequences than on others, where risk acceptance 
is concerned) should not be included in the quantitative expression of risk. It may be 
relevant to consider on a qualitative basis certain aspects of risk aversion in relation to 
assessment of risk and its tolerability. [3] 
The implication of the definition is further that perceived risk (i.e. subjectively evaluated 
risk performed by individuals) should not be included in the expression of risk [34]. 
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When accident consequences are considered, these may be related to personnel, to the 
environment, and to the assets and the production capacity. These are sometimes 
called “dimensions of risk” [3]. 
Risk is also expressed as ‘’uncertainty of the performance of a system, quantified by 
probabilities of observable quantities’’ [1]. 
It is very necessary and prerequisite for discussing risk analysis and risk management 
that there should be clear perspective about risk. There exists many definitions of risk, 
but this thesis will use following definition of risk by [2]: 
 ‘’Combination of possible consequences and associated uncertainties (quantified by 
probabilities)’’ 
Moreover, this definition can be observed as an extension of the ISO standard (ISO, 
2002) definition; combination of the probability of an event and its consequences, and in 
this manner uncertainties are expressed by probabilities. One can not necessarily say 
that low uncertainty means low risk or high uncertainty means high risk. For example in 
a specific diving activity in offshore involves two possible outcomes say (0, 1) and 
similarly two fatalities (0,1), have two alternatives A &B. It has uncertainty (probability) 
distribution (0.6, 0.4) and (0,1) respectively. Hence for alternative ‘A’ there is higher 
uncertainty and lower risk to initiate activity while alternative ‘B’ shows highest risk 
because of certain fact that if a person start this activity he/she will get accident. So as a 
result we can say that for understanding clear perspective about risk, it is necessary to 
see both dimensions [1]. 
Normally a risk analysis is a systematic evaluation of risk connected to an installation, 
system, subsystem, project, job etc. Risk analysis search to identify incidents which 
potentially could develop into accidents and then mapping both the consequences and 
probabilities of a such an accident.  
The main objective of performing risk analyses is to support decision-making processes. 
Risk analysis enables us to take both certain and uncertain quantities into account and 
calculate to what extent specific events or scenarios can be expected to occur in the 
future. Thus risk analysis provides a basis for comparing alternative concepts, actions 
or system configurations under uncertainty [12]. 
Among other objectives, risk analysis are useful to:                                                                                        
To ensure adequate safety, value adding and cost effectiveness for existing and future 
 14
petroleum industry developments.                                                                                                    
To prevent all events or chain of events that may cause loss of life, or damage to   
health, the environment or assets. 
A model below see figure 2, presenting the process of executing risk analysis and 
getting the results. This model performs risk acceptance criteria and therefore is in 
accordance with the management regulations and is a common way of performing risk 
analysis and the use of risk acceptance criteria [34]. 
 
 
                         Figure 2: Risk estimation, analysis and evaluation [34]  
 
 
 
 
 
Planning the analysis 
System definition 
Additional risk reducing measures 
Acceptance Criteria 
Risk Picture 
Consequences analysis Frequency analysis 
Risk reducing measures 
Hazard identification 
    Risk evaluation 
 15
2.3  Risk Management  
 
The purpose of risk management is to ensure that adequate measures are taken to 
protect people, the environment and assets from harmful consequences of the activities 
being undertaken, as well as balancing different concerns, in particular HES (Health, 
Environment and Safety) and costs. Risk management includes measures both to avoid 
the occurrence of hazards and reduce their potential harms [2].   
It is acknowledged that the ability to define what may happen in the future, assessment 
of risk and associated uncertainties, and to select best alternative lies at the heart of the 
risk management system, which helps in many range of decision-making, from 
allocating wealth to safeguarding public health, from exploring new reservoirs to 
decommissioning/disposal of a project, from paying insurance premiums to wearing a 
seat belt etc. Risk management has the following set of goals:  
• Identify, assess and control risks that threaten the achievement of the defined project 
objectives, like regularity, schedule, cost targets and performance of project delivery. 
These risk management activities should support the day-to-day management of the 
project as well as contribute to efficient decision making at important decision points.  
• Develop and implement a framework, processes and procedures that ensure the 
initiation and execution of risk management activities throughout the project.  
• Adapt the framework, processes and procedures so that the interaction with other 
project processes flow in a seamless and logical manner.  
For instance, exploring and producing oil and gas involves risky investments. When 
petroleum executives make investment decisions on petroleum projects, they face 
several uncertainties including future oil and gas prices, reserves, efficient maintenance, 
environment, petroleum prospective-ness, fiscal terms, current degree of exploration 
and operational peculiarities. How can the petroleum and gas  industry cope to these 
and other challenges, and making decision on the allocation of capital among 
competing projects in diverse geographical areas.  
Suppose we can take an example of oil and gas company which has to choose between 
two types of area (just assuming North sea and Barent sea) for their new project related 
to Oil and gas field. To support the decision making ,the company evaluates the 
concepts with respect to a number of factors i.e. investment costs, operational costs, 
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schedules, market deliveries and regularity, technology development, reservoir 
recovery, environmental aspects, safety aspects, external factors. After evaluation and 
measuring these factors qualitative and quantitatively, an alternative will be chosen. The 
best alternative is one which is acceptable for all stake-holders and considered to be the 
one giving highest profitability, almost no fatal accidents and no environmental damage. 
Since it is impossible to know with certainty which alternative is the best as there are 
risks and uncertainties involved. So the decision of choosing a specific alternative has 
to be based on predictions of costs and other key performance measures, and 
assessments of risk and uncertainties. 
Similarly when we discuss the effects of changing the test interval of safety critical 
valves, then one have to consider the factors like the  economic cost, maintenance cost,  
production loss,  regularity,  process shut downs,  maintainability and availability. 
Leakage acceptance criteria, testing methods, testing cost etc. After evaluating and 
measuring these factors, one of the best alternatives could be choose, which would be 
acceptable to all stake-holders.  
 
 
 
 
 
2.4  Decision Making and Risk Management 
 
Now a days, there is a great need and importance for the implementation of risk 
management in various industries and in society. We all agreed that risk cannot be 
eliminated but must be reduced and managed. It seems to be high expectations, that 
risk management is the proper framework for obtaining the proper balance between 
benefits and burdens, i.e. exploring opportunities on the one hand and avoidance of 
accidents and catastrophes on the other. 
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Figure 3: Basic structure of the decision-making process [1]   
In figure 3: illustrates a decision-making process described by [1]. In this process, 
decision alternatives should be generated, analysis and evaluations should be carried 
out, the alternatives should be generated, analysis and evaluations should be carried 
out (which provides important background information to decision), the alternatives 
should be reviewed, and finally, a decision should be made. Both the analysis and the 
review process are affected by the stakeholders’ values, goals, criteria and preferences 
[10].  
Decision making is obviously not only about making decisions, but making good 
decisions. Risk management involves decision making in situations involving high risks 
and large uncertainties, and such decision-making is difficult as it is hard to predict what 
would be the consequences (outcomes) of the decisions. A number of tools are 
available to support decision making in such situations, such as cost-benefit analyses, 
cost-effectiveness analyses, Bayesian decision analysis, risk and uncertainty analyses 
and risk acceptance criteria. [1] 
 
2.4.1  Decision Supporting Tools 
There are several different views regarding decision making and all have their pros and 
cons. Here I would like to give brief overview of some of the approaches based on [1]: 
Expected utility paradigm:                                                                                                        
In expected utility paradigm, suppose if a person is coherent in his preferences among 
consequences and his opinions about uncertainty quantities, then expected utility 
approach is attractive as it provides recommendations based on a logical basis. On the 
Decision  
problem 
Decision 
Alternative 
Analyses and  
evaluations 
Risk analysis and 
decision analysis               
     
Managerial 
review and 
judgement  
 
 Decision 
Stakeholder 
values  
Goals, criteria 
and Preferences 
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other hand in expected utility approach preferences have to be specified for all 
consequences, which is a difficult task in practice, moreover, almost no role of 
management in this case.   
Cost-Benefit Analysis:                                                                                                    
The economical aspects of a project, plant, system etc. are of most importance, and 
usually one will have to document that the benefit of solutions and efforts is higher than 
the associated cost. Cost benefit analysis is a way to evaluate the advantages and 
disadvantages between different efforts .The main advantage with the use of cost 
benefit analysis is that it forms basis for prioritizing between alternative solutions. In 
connection with risk analysis where different risk reducing measures are identified, cost 
benefit is of great value. There is only one thing, i.e. money that prevents all risk 
reducing measures to be implemented. If one should reach a risk level as low as 
possible regardless of the connected cost, every identified risk reducing measure 
should of course be implemented but however there is rarely the case.  
By performing a cost benefit analysis, one will get a good decision support for choosing 
between alternative risk reducing measures. The method will search to assign monetary 
values to each benefit, thus making the decision between the alternative solutions 
easier. There are several ways to perform such an analysis. 
Common ways to perform such analysis is to assign monetary values for future 
investments, cost of testing, cost of poor reputation, and cost of a human life and so on. 
These are all parts of what one call cost benefit factors, all contributing to visualize 
possible effects of a project at a certain point. 
However when we see cost benefit analysis, it requires us to indicate the value of a 
statistical life, not the value of a life. As we acknowledge that a life has in principle an 
infinite value. So, there should be no amount of money that a person would find 
sufficient to compensate the loss of life. While a statistical life has a finite value, 
considering that point; decisions need to be taken that balance benefits and risks for 
loss of life. It means we are willing to accept the value of loss, given that this benefit is 
present.  
Multi-attribute Analysis                                                                                                      
In many cases, we perform a multi-attribute analysis without any explicit trade-offs and 
is rather easy to conduct and works in practice. After assessing the various attributes, 
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costs, production loss, regularity, safety, environment, political aspects, etc., separately 
then it is a management task to make a decision by balancing the costs and benefits 
and thus we gain flexibility in situations involving many stakeholders. But again in some 
cases it lacks coherency in decision making.  
For making a good decision, focus should be on situations characterized by a potential 
of rather large consequences and large associated uncertainties which relate to 
economic performance, possible accidents leading to loss of lives or environmental 
damage, etc. Risk and decision analyses plays very important role to support good 
decision making. 
 
 
ALARP –principle 
It is abbreviation for ‘As Low as Reasonable Practicable’ being used to make decision 
concerning risk. In Norwegian oil and gas industry, traditionally predefined risk 
acceptance criteria is used. Those criteria are made with basis in both internal/external 
regulations and objectives for the company. But when the ALARP principle is used, one 
do not stop when the estimated risk level is within the limits of risk acceptance rather 
one has to keep searching for other risk reducing measures and implementing them as 
long as it is reasonably practicable. Therefore, obviously cost efficiency and the ALARP 
principle has a strong relation in principle. The concept of cost efficiency is to evaluate 
the benefit of implementing further risk reducing measures. If the expected cost for 
implementing a new risk reducing measure is lower than the expected benefit, this risk 
reducing measure will be implemented. The ALARP principle could be followed when no 
more risk measures are regarded beneficial to implement, it means that the cost of 
further implementation is grossly disproportional with the expected benefit. The 
remaining risk level is then considered acceptable. 
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Figure 4: The ALARP principle is described according to [34]   
 
One of best way to visualize the ALARP region is perhaps through matrix which is 
described below: 
Risk Matrix 
 Consequence 
Catastrophic Severe Moderate Minimal 
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Often    ALARP 
Probable   ALARP  
Rare  ALARP   
Unlikely ALARP    
 
 
Figure 5:  Risk Matrix 
The yellow part of the risk matrix represents the ALARP region, where further risk 
reducing measures have to be implemented if it is presumed to be cost effective .The 
red area represents a risk level unacceptable while the green area represents a risk 
level as an acceptable.  
=Acceptable  = Unacceptable =ALARP Area 
Unacceptable region 
Upper limit 
ALARP-region 
Acceptable region 
(Large disparity between cost and 
risk reducing effect) 
ALARP 
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3. Regulations/ Standards 
 
This chapter is about different regulations/standards presented by the authority of the 
Norwegian Petroleum Directorate (NPD) and the Petroleum Safety Authority Norway 
(PSAN) related to maintenance program and further related to safety critical systems.  
The legislation consists of a two parts; resource management or ‘‘resource hierarchic’’ 
part and a health, environment and safety (HES) or ‘‘HES hierarchic’’ part; which further 
display different legislation levels.  
In the HES area, the Norwegian Pollution Control Authority, the Norwegian Social and 
Health Directorate and the PSA (former NPD) co-operate on joint, total regulations 
relating to health, environment and safety on the Norwegian continental shelf.  Hence, 
the HES regulations are issued in pursuance of the Petroleum Act, the Pollution Act, the 
Product Control Act, the Health Personnel Act, The Patients' Rights Act, The 
Communicable Diseases Control Act and Health related and Social Preparedness Act. 
The regulations are the framework regulations (Royal Decree), the management 
regulations, the information duty regulations, the facilities regulations and the activities 
regulations. Guidelines to the regulations have been prepared by [27]: 
                       
Figure 6:   Hierarchical description of Acts/Regulations/Standards: 
 
 
Acts 
Regulations 
Guidelines 
Standards 
Industry Practice 
Authorising Acts 
Product control act 
Pollution and waste Act 
    Petroleum Act  
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Regulations are connected together as shown in figure 6;   Some points related to  
figure 6 is explained below. 
Acts and regulations come on the first and second level in hierarchy. Then are the 
guidelines to regulations for detail explanation and similarly these guidelines showed 
some specific requirement which is called standards.  
->Petroleum Activities Legislation (Acts and Regulations) 
For example, Petroleum activities Act § 9-1 says ‘‘The petroleum activities shall be 
conducted in such manner as to enable a high level of safety to be maintained and 
further developed in accordance with the technological development’’ 
->Guidelines to Regulations 
These are guidelines to different regulations relating to management, information duty, 
facilities and activities under the ‘‘Joint regulations’’. E.g. OLF (Norwegian Oil Industry 
Association)g recommended guidelines for the application of IEC (International 
Electrotechnical Commission) 61508 and IEC 61511 in the petroleum activities on the 
Norwegian Continental Shelf, 
->Standards:  The guidelines to the regulations often refer to recognized standards as a 
way to fulfil the functional requirements in the regulations. International Standards like 
ISO, API, IEC, OLF guidelines, EN and NORSOK standards are often used. 
->Industry internal governing documents like ‘‘Testing of safety critical valves in 
gas/condensate pipeline system’’. 
In NORSOK standards Z – 008, maintenance defined as –  
“The combination of all technical, administrative and managerial actions, 
including supervision actions, during life cycle of an item intended to retain it in, 
or restore it to, a state in which it can perform the required function”  
Maintenance includes activities such as monitoring, inspection, testing and repairing. 
This means that is all what is required to keep or to get the item or system back into 
desired operating condition.  
According to §7 of the Activities Regulations; the safety functions at all times will be able 
to provide functions  and  should be designed so that they can be tested and maintained 
without impairing the performance of the function. 
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Similarly under the §32 of the Activities Regulations, it says that ‘’facilities shall have an 
emergency shutdown system which is able to prevent situations of hazard and accident 
from developing and to limit the consequences of accidents, on safety functions. The 
system shall be able to perform the intended functions independently of other systems’’.  
Moreover, the emergency shutdown system shall be designed so that it will go to or 
remain in a safe condition in the event of a failure which may prevent the functioning of 
the system. 
More specifically, ‘’emergency shutdown valves shall be installed which are capable of 
stopping streams of hydrocarbons and chemicals to and from the facility, and which 
isolate the fire areas on the facility’’ 
In §44 (maintenance programme) under the Activities regulations states that the 
emergency shutdown system should be verified in accordance with the safety integrity 
levels stipulated on the basis of the IEC 61508 standard and OLF's Guidelines 070. In 
addition to that plants which are not included by this standard and these guidelines, the 
operability should be verified through a full-scale function test at least once each year. 
The test should cover all parts of the safety function, including closing of valves. The 
test should also include measurement of interior leakage through closed valves. 
Recording of the plant's or equipment's functionality in situations where the function is 
triggered or put to use may replace testing of the plant or the equipment, 
The OLF (Norwegian Oil Industry Association) recommended guidelines for the 
application of IEC 61508 and IEC 61511 in the petroleum activities on the Norwegian 
continental Shelf, says that periodical functional tests shall be conducted using a 
documented procedure to detect covert faults that prevent the SIS (Safety Instrumented 
Systems) from operating according to the safety requirement specifications. The entire 
SIS shall be tested including the sensor(s), the logic solver, and the final element(s) 
(e.g., shutdown valves, motors) [36]. 
In addition, It is recommended to record and analyse activation of SIS functions to 
include the activation as part of the functional testing. If proper operation and 
documentation thereof exist for a period, the manual proof test for that period may be 
omitted. Observe that the spurious activation of an ESV due to a PSD, does not test the 
entire function of the same valve during an ESD action. 
Moreover, In OLF guidelines it is mentioned that, some periodic interval (determined by 
the user), the frequency(s) of testing for the SIS or portions of the SIS shall be re-
 24
evaluated based on historical data, installation experience, hardware degradation, 
software reliability, etc. Change of interval is handled as a modification. Any change to 
the application logic requires full functional testing, and shall be treated as a 
modification. Exceptions to this are allowed if appropriate review and partial testing of 
changes are done to ensure that the SIL has not been compromised.  
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4. Valves 
 
Valves are mechanical devices specifically designed to direct, start, stop, mix, or 
regulate the flow, pressure, or temperature of a process fluid. Valves can be handle 
either liquid or gas applications [5]. 
Valves are used in pipeline systems to control the flow rate, the pressure, or the flow 
direction of a fluid. They can turn on, turn off, regulate, modulate or isolate the fluid. 
 
4.1  Valve Types 
 
4.1.1  Gate valves 
Gate valves are used when straight-line, laminar fluid flow and minimum restrictions are 
needed. These valves use a wedge-shaped sliding plate in the valve body to stop, 
throttle or permit full flow of fluids through the valve. When the valve is wide open, the 
gate is completely inside the valve bonnet. This leaves the flow passage through the 
valve fully open with no flow restrictions allowing little or no pressure drop through the 
valve [19]. 
Gate valves are designed to operate fully open or fully closed; when fully opened, there 
is very little pressure drop across a gate valve, and when fully closed there is good 
sealing against pressure. 
With the proper mating of a disk to the seat ring, very little or no leakage occurs across 
the disk when the gate valve is closed. However, some leakage may occur under very 
low back pressures. Another positive feature of gate valves is that they usually open or 
close slowly, which prevents fluid hammer and subsequent damage to the piping 
system. 
The main limitation of gate valves is that they are not suitable for throttling applications. 
When gate valves are used in throttling applications, the flow tends to have high speeds 
near the gate seat, which leads to erosion. Also, in the partially open state, the valve is 
prone to vibrate, which can lead to damage. In general gate valves are more subject to 
seat and disk wear than globe valves, and repairs, such as lapping and grinding, are 
more difficult to accomplish.  
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4.1.2   Ball valves 
 
Ball valves are simple shutoff devices that use a ball to stop and start the flow of fluid 
downstream of the valve. As the valve stem turns to the open position, the ball rotates 
to a point where part or the entire hole machined through the ball is in line with the 
valve-body inlet and outlet. This allows fluid to pass through the valve. When the ball 
rotates so that the hole is perpendicular to the flow path the flow stops [19]. 
This rotational-motion valve uses a ball-shaped disk with a hole bored through to stop or 
start fluid flow. When the valve handle is turned to the open position, the ball is rotated 
so that the hole lines up with the valve body’s inlet and outlet. When the ball is rotated 
so the hole is perpendicular to flow, the valve is closed. 
Advantage of ball valve is ease of operation, high flow capacity, and a high pressure 
and temperature tolerance. In addition, they have the ability to provide fire-safe 
protection, and they can handle severe service chemicals. Ball valves typically have 
lower cost and weight, and provide tight shutoff and low stem leakage. They can be 
adapted to for use in multiple port configurations. 
 
4.1.3  Check valves 
The purpose of a check valve is to allow fluid flow in one preferred direction and to 
prevent back flow or flow in the opposite direction. Ideally, a check valve will begin to 
close as the pressure drops in a pipeline and the fluid momentum slows. When the flow 
direction reverses, the check valve should close completely. Check valves can be of the 
following types: swing, lift and tilting disk. 
 
 
4.2  Failure modes 
A failure mode is a description of a fault. To identify the failure modes it is necessary to 
study the outputs of various functions. Some functions may have several outputs. Some 
outputs may be given a very strict definition, such that it is easy to determine whether 
the output requirements are fulfilled or not. In other cases the output may be specified 
as a target value with an acceptable deviation [20] . See Figure 7:  
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        Figure 7:  Illustration of the difference between failure, fault and error 
 
When considering a process shutdown valve, it should be designed a specified closing 
time, for example, 10 seconds. If the valve closes too slowly, it will not function as safety 
barrier. On the other hand, if the valve closes too fast, it can probably cause pressure 
shock destroying the valve or the valve flanges. Closing time between 6 and 14 
seconds may, for example, be acceptable, and it can be stated that the valve is 
functioning as long as the closing time is within the interval. The criticality of the failure 
will obviously increase with the deviation from the target value [20].  
In OREDA (Offshore Reliability Data) project, although it’s only related to offshore 
activities, but failure modes listed below are almost occurs in onshore valves also:  
DOP   Delayed operation  
EXL   External leakage to environment  
FID   Faulty indication  
FTC   Failed to close (Actuator failure)  
FTO   Failed to open (Actuator failure)  
INL   Internal leakage in closed position  
LCP   Leakage in closed position  
OVH   Overhaul  
PLU   Plugged  
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SPO   Spurious operation  
OTH   Other  
UNK   Unknown  
It is important to understand that a failure mode is a expression of the failures as seen 
from the outside, that is, the termination of one or more functions. “Internal leakage” is 
thus a failure mode of shutdown valve, since the valve looses its required function to 
“close flow”. Wear of the valve seal, however, represents a cause of failure and is hence 
not a failure mode of the valve.  
A classification scheme for failure modes has been suggested by [21]:   
1) Intermittent failures: Failures that result in lack of some function only for a very short 
period of time.  
2) Extended failures: Failures that result in lack of some function that will continue until 
some part of the functional block is replaced or repaired. Extended failures may be 
further divided into:  
a) Complete failures: Failures that cause complete lack of a required function 
b) Partial failures: Failures that lead to a lack of some function, but do not cause a 
complete lack of a required function. 
Both the complete and partial failures may be further classified: 
a) Sudden failures: Failures that could not be forecast by prior testing. 
b) Gradual failures: Failures that could be forecast by testing. A gradual failure will 
represent a gradual “wearing out” of the specified range of performance values. 
The extended failures are split into four categories; two of these are given specific 
names: 
a) Catastrophic failures: A failure that is both sudden and complete. 
b) Degraded failure: A failure that is both partial and gradual. 
The failure classification described above is illustrated in Figure 8, which is adapted 
from Blanche and Shrivastava (1994), [20]: 
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                       Figure 8: Failure classification [21]   
 
4.3  Failure causes and failure effects 
 
The function of a system usually consists of several sub functions. Failure modes at one 
level in the hierarchy will often be caused by failure modes on the next lower level. It is 
important to link failure modes on lower levels to the main top level responses, in order 
to provide traceability to the essential system responses as the functional structure is 
refined. This is illustrated in Figure 9, for a hardware structure breakdown [20]. 
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Figure 10: Failure cause classification [20]   
These various failure causes are not necessarily separate; there could be overlap 
between some of them. For example, there is an obvious overlap between “weakness” 
failures and “design” and “manufacturing” failures.  
Failure mechanisms are, according to IEC, the “physical, chemical or other processes 
that has led to a failure.” These processes can, for example, be wear, corrosion, 
hardening, pitting, oxidation etc.  
This level of failure cause description is, however, not sufficient to evaluate possible 
remedies. Wear can, for instance, be result of wrong material specification (design 
failure), usage outside specification limits (misuse failure), poor maintenance 
(mishandling failure), and so forth. These fundamental causes are referred to as root 
causes (see figure 10), the causes upon which remedial actions can be decided.  
A general picture of the relationship between cause and effect is that each failure mode 
can be caused by several different failure causes, leading to several different failure 
effects. To get a broader understanding of the relationship between these terms, the 
different levels of see figure 9, should be brought into account.  
Figure 9, shows that failure mode on the lowest level is one of the failure causes on the 
next higher level and the failure effect on the lowest level equals the failure mode on the 
next higher level. The failure mode “leakage from sealing” for the seal component is, for 
example, one of the possible failure causes for the failure mode “internal leakage” for 
the valve, and the failure effect on the next higher level  “internal leakage” resulting from 
“leakage from sealing” is the same as the failure mode “internal leakage” of the valve 
[20].   
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4.4  Why Testing of Valves/equipment 
 
In NORSOK standards Z – 008, maintenance defined as –  
 
“a combination of all technical, administrative and managerial actions, including 
supervision actions, during life cycle of an item intended to retain it in, or restore 
it to, a state in which it can perform the required function”  
 
According to above definition, that is all what is required to keep or to get the item or 
system back into desired operating condition.  
In §7 of the activities regulations it is stated that facilities shall be equipped with 
necessary safety functions which at all times are able to: 
a)  Detect abnormal conditions, 
b)  Prevent abnormal conditions from developing into situations of hazard and accident,  
c)  Limit harm in the event of accidents. 
 Similarly under the §32 of the activities regulations, it says that ‘’facilities shall have an 
emergency shutdown system which is able to prevent situations of hazard and accident 
from developing and to limit the consequences of accidents, on safety functions. The 
system shall be able to perform the intended functions independently of other 
systems’’    
More specifically, ‘’emergency shutdown valves shall be installed which are capable of 
stopping streams of hydrocarbons and chemicals to and from the facility, and which 
isolate the fire areas on the facility’’ 
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Figure 11:  Maintenance management in a time perspective [22] 
From figure 11, No more than a few decades ago, maintenance function was 
considered as an unwanted necessity, which is almost impossible to manage. This 
 33
vision changed with time and maintenance became a separate service that had the 
centre attention on technical aspects, with the weight on specialization and efficient 
working methods. More recently, the progress was the realization that there were more 
efficient ways in terms of optimizing use of the means and more effective ways in terms 
of achieving the desired results and it was positive cooperation with other operating 
functions (Internal partnership) [22]:    
In [41], it is stated that the purposes of monitoring, testing and other preventive 
maintenance actions are the detection of the degradation and prevention from the 
failure of the safety functions of systems and equipment and the assurance of prompt 
correction and restoration of these safety functions. 
In order to optimize the level of inspection and maintenance activities, equipment/valves 
are inspected and tested to: 
§ To evaluate ageing effects of an equipment 
§ Check corrosion 
§ To prevent accidental events and damage 
§ To analyse dynamic degradation and failure mechanism. 
§ To estimate the probabilities of degradation. 
§ To access the consequences of different degradation cases and evaluate their 
severity according to the probabilities of the worst consequences due 
degradation. 
§ To perform the risk ranking for each component. 
§ To make appropriate recommendations, based on results in order to improve the 
operation and maintenance. 
§ To keep regularity flow constant, we need to test valves and other equipment 
periodically. 
§ To check the reliability and availability of the valve/equipment.  
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4.5    Safety Critical valves 
 
In this report we, by the term Safety critical valves refer to emergency shut down 
system(ESD).                                                                                                                        
The emergency shut down system (ESD system) is a safety system that constitutes an 
important barrier (the ESD barrier). Fundamental tasks for the ESD barrier are to stop 
streams of hydrocarbons and chemicals to and from the facility, and isolate the fire 
areas on the facility. To manage to do this the ESD barrier are depending by the 
functionality of ESD valves [18]. 
Based on company interpretations [23], to define whether or not a valve is safety-critical 
is determined on an evaluation of the safety importance, i.e. how important it is for 
safety point of view. Therefore an analysis/assessment is needed to demonstrate how 
the risk level could be affected to the following failure modes: 
§ Valve fails to close on demand 
§ Valve fails to close within the specified time 
§ That it leaks 
 
To identify safety critical valves; the required analysis/assessment is performed in to 
three steps: 
1 – To Identify and illustrate the functions of the valve 
Valve functions that are important to safety should be identified, i.e. the functions whose 
failure could result in an unacceptable risk, e.g. failure to close, leakage through closed 
valve. 
A safety critical valve normally has more than one function, these are as follows: 
• Does it have an ESD or PSD function? 
• Is the valve part of an overpressure protection system? 
• Is it designed to close/seal off the flow in both directions? 
• Is the valve part of a double block and bleed setup? 
• Other functions. 
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2 – To explain the effects on safety of the above failure modes 
3 – To classify critical/unacceptable leakage rate through the valve 
In the onshore plants, acceptable leakage rates generally set higher than for an offshore 
installation, the main reason for this is due to lower human risk exposure in onshore 
plants. 
The acceptance criteria shown in Table 1, is determined on the basis of whether the 
contribution to risk of a leakage through the valve is acceptable, required some 
measures or not acceptable. According to the performed analysis of some onshore 
terminals and gas transportation systems [23], recommended reference values for 
leakage rates are established in table: 
Table 1: Acceptance criteria for leakage through closed valves 
Leak rate  [kg/s] Action 
< 0.05 Acceptable  
0.05  – 1.0 Perform specific evaluations, Plan for 
repair. 
> 1.0 Not acceptable - repair 
 
The wide range between the lower and upper limits, i.e. from 0.05 kg/s to 1.0 kg/s, is 
calculated and mainly based on practical considerations. Current industry experience 
shows that most valves (>99 of 100) satisfy the lower limit requirement i.e. <0.05 kg/s.  
4.5.1  Testing Methods 
There are a number of test methods have been used, such as measurement of the 
differential pressure over the closed valve, testing by depressurise cavity on the valve, 
partial stroke testing, microphone testing of the  closed valve and microphone testing on 
open valve. Testing of safety critical valves can also be testing of function (close) or 
testing of leakage (including interior leakage or leakage through closed valve). The 
various testing methods are different with respect to the required performance in real 
shut-down situations.  
§ Testing of the function (close) with real shut-down case 
§ Testing of the function (close) with plant shut down 
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According to the company interpretations [23], this test is not considered complete 
since the forces acting on the valve body and valve internals are different from the 
real case. Thus the test does not disclose all relevant failure mechanisms. 
§ Partial stroke testing 
The main advantage with this test is that one can avoid shut-down of the plant, 
therefore it is only relevant while the plant is in  normal operation; but this test is not 
considered complete because the test does not demonstrate full closure of the 
valve. Thus the test does not disclose all relevant failure mechanisms. 
It is preferred that, a test should reflect the intended function in a real situation. 
According to company interpretations [23]; for an emergency shutdown (ESD) valve, this 
sort of testing should normally be complete closing of the valve with the system under 
pressure and in operation.  
However, in some cases there may occur unwanted effects of these ideal tests, like 
economic consequences related to lost production, but also sometimes negative effects 
on safety and environment.  
Based on the industry experience [23], the optimal system for testing therefore may well 
be one that applies different test methods, and combinations of tests, in a consistent 
program, individually tailored to the specific safety critical valve. 
Testing methods of leakage through valve 
Different testing methods are used to observe the leakage through the safety critical 
valve: 
§  Leakage test through closed valve with full pressure differential across the valve. 
§  Leakage test through closed valve with different pressure levels up- and 
downstream of the valve 
§ Leakage test through closed valve, by measurement of leak rates into the valve 
body/cavity. 
§ Leakage test with valve in open position 
When we talk about testing of leakage rate through a closed valve; acceptance criteria 
for leakage rates through the valve at normal full differential pressure across the valve 
should be defined. 
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5. Challenges By Changing The Test-Interval 
 
This chapter firstly  in section 5.1, discusses  the current industry challenges related to 
the testing of land-based safety critical valves. The testing of safety valves are 
beneficial in a way that they increase the chances that the valves are going to conduct 
intended functions but unfortunately, testing of safety critical valves also lead to some 
disadvantages. Such disadvantages can be for example, that a process must be shut 
down, which gives a disadvantage both in relation to the production loss and in relation 
to safety. 
Moreover, section 5.2 and 5.3 describes the effects of changing the test interval of 
these valves, focusing on specifically two different dilemmas i.e. ‘if test-interval is 
greater than one year’ and ‘if test-interval is less than year’. 
 
 
 
5.1  Industry Challenges  
 
Petroleum Safety Authority (PSA) took over regulatory responsibility for the supervision 
of technical and operational safety, as well as the working environment to the land-
based plants i.e. Kårstø, Kollsnes, Sture, Tjeldbergodden, Mongstad, Melkøya and 
Slagentangen 1. January 2004. In this connection, they have introduced requirements 
for the testing of safety critical valves in the pipeline system. 
Safety critical valves are used to perform one or several important functions, such as 
closing or opening to provide over-pressure protection, in order to minimize emissions 
to the external environment through the external leak and to isolate the maintenance 
activities. Testing and maintenance of the valves is carried out in accordance with the 
maintenance programme to increase the probability that the valves are going to fulfil 
their intended functions. A positive test results in practice gives increased belief that the 
valve will be able to carry out the intended function as needed. A negative test results 
indicate that something is not efficient as it should be, and therefore for example could 
followed up with more frequent testing and possible repairs, which in turn leads to 
increased belief that the valve will be able to carry out the intended function as needed. 
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We conclude that the testing of safety valves are positive in that they increase the 
chances that the valves are going to be able to conduct intended functions. 
Unfortunately, testing of safety critical valves also lead to some disadvantages. Such 
disadvantages can be for example, that a process must be stopped (shut down); when 
the test will be carried out. This provides a disadvantage both in relation to the delayed 
production (downtime) and in relation to safety, in this case a large amount  of 
hydrocarbon leaks occurs in connection with the up and down driving of processing. 
Moreover, it is also noted that work on the equipment itself is a risk, in a manner that a 
high percentage of hydrocarbon leaks can occur just by doing maintenance work on the 
equipment.  
From above, we see that the testing of safety critical valves are desirable because it 
contributes to improve safety. At the same time, it is important to ensure that no tests 
are conducted too frequently. Therefore, we wish to test these valves "often enough", 
but not "too often", but what is often enough? This is the one question, which is 
concerned by both authorities and different players in the current industry. 
There are a number of test methods, such as measurement of the differential pressure  
over the closed valve,  partial stroke testing, microphone testing of the  closed valve and 
microphone testing on open valve. The question of how often the safety critical valves 
should be tested can not be answered without having to consider which test methods 
that will be used; how often it is appropriate to test the valves are connected to test-
methods. Microphone testing of  open valve can for example, in principle be carried out 
continuously (every second), similarly more frequent testing obviously would not be 
appropriate in the case of  the partial stroke testing. In principle, we do not need to 
restrict a test regime to just one test method. One can, if it is considered to be 
appropriate, combine different test methods with different test frequencies to test 
regimes. Thus the question is: which test regime is appropriate to use in safety-critical 
valves? 
In addition, we can say that one test regime is not necessarily appropriate for all safety-
critical valves. Valve design, the consequences of downtime, environmental aspects of 
the testing, etc. varies between different safety critical valves. Such variations mean that 
test regime for one valve does not necessarily should be the same as for another valve. 
In principle it can be carried out detailed studies for every safety critical valve. But it's 
not necessarily appropriate. Presumably it will be best to first categorize safety critical 
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valves and then do individual evaluation for certain categories of safety critical valves 
and other categories can have the more standardized maintenance program. But which 
valves should be in which category? 
In conclusion, we can say that the consequences of weak/fail maintenance programme 
for safety critical valves could be serious: "Too often" testing can lead to unnecessary 
production loss, with major economic consequences, and the danger/risk of test-
induced errors. "Too less" testing can lead to the valves failure, which in a result could 
have major consequences in relation to safety and long downtime during repairs. The 
choice of inappropriate test regimes can lead to unnecessary downtime and 
environmental emissions in testing. For small variation in test regimes can cause the 
individual differences between the valves which could not taken good enough into 
considerations, and for the large variety of test regimes could lead to a complex system 
for planning and carrying out tests. It is obvious that the "good" test regime can be   
found by balancing all of the above considerations against each other. But to find such a 
balance is difficult, and is a challenge for all companies to have safety critical valves. 
 
 
 
5.2    Effects of changing the test interval of safety critical valves 
 
Changing test interval means increase or decrease of the interval period compare to 
current standard test interval (which is one year) followed by industry. In usual practical 
applications testing and inspection is the most relevant and effective means of 
deterioration control. 
The observed failure frequency, together with a criticality evaluation, will be a basis for 
prioritizing the maintenance work and optimization of test intervals [2]; 
When one talks about effects of changing the test interval of safety critical valves, one 
should be very clear that every scenario of changing test interval has advantages and 
disadvantages, therefore some times ideal is not achieved in a simple way. 
In fact cost, the level of risk and the benefits from risk control are closely linked see 
figure 12, we can say any expected increase in benefit from a decision may increase  
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the risk if cost are kept constant or any reduction in risk may reduce  the benefits as 
cost may increase. 
                                    
Figure 12: Relationship between risk, cost and benefit  [22]  
 
From figure 12, suppose one increases the test interval from 1 year to 2 years, then 
there would be some benefits like increase uptime of processing plant, avoidance of 
production loss, however this may also  increase the risk related to probability of failure 
of a valve, degradation mechanism of valves like, corrosion, erosion, scaling etc.; and 
lastly cost remain constant. Thus, one of above these (cost, benefits, risk) can not be 
changed with out affecting the others. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
5.3 Different dilemmas of changing test interval of Safety Critical Valve 
There are different dilemmas that can be analyzed to see the effects of changing the 
test interval. In table 2, among others, specifically two dilemmas are illustrated i.e. in 
first dilemma, we set test interval greater than one year which mean ‘not often’ testing. 
Similarly in the other case, one can set test interval less than one year, which means 
‘too often’ testing of these safety critical valves.  
Many factors like safety, production loss, economic aspects, reliability, and probability of 
failures related to these two dilemmas will be discussed in section 5.3.1. 
In company’s internal document [23], it is mentioned that ‘‘reference value for test-
interval is 1 year, the program can deviates if satisfactory documentation is justified’’. 
 
Cost  
Risk 
Benefits 
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Table 2: Different dilemmas of changing test interval of Safety Critical Valve 
                        Test interval> 1 year               Test interval < 1 year 
Positive effects Negative effects Positive effects Negative effects 
§ Save economic cost 
§ Reduction in 
maintenance cost 
§  Avoidance of 
production loss 
§  Less number of 
process shut downs 
§ Improve regularity 
 
§ May cause 
higher  risk 
related to safety 
level  
§ Performance 
issues 
§ May cause 
higher frequency 
of occurrence of 
failure 
§ High reliability and 
functionality of 
equipment 
§ Improved safety 
level 
§ Higher 
maintainability and 
availability 
§ May increase 
leakage 
§ Maintenance cost 
increased 
§ More production 
shut downs may 
affects other 
installations 
§ Labour intensive 
 
           
 
5.3.1  Discussion 
 
There are some advantages and disadvantages related to each dilemma; see table 2. 
Firstly, we see that current company interpretations about testing of safety critical valve 
which is once a year; is quiet satisfactory. In the company’s internal document [23]; is 
mentioned about safety critical valve that: ’’the reference value for test interval is 1 year. 
The program may deviate from this, provided that adequate and documented grounds 
for this are stated’’  
There are many critical factors involve in each dilemma. Followings are the some 
‘‘critical factors and their impacts’’ involved in changing the test interval of ESV. table 3: 
Table 3:  Critical factors (assumed) and their impacts, effecting on changing the test-interval 
Critical Factors                           Impacts 
Interval <1 year Interval =1 year Interval >1 year 
Failure Probability  Very Low  Low Relatively high 
Reliability Very high  High  No big effects 
Maintenance Cost High Relatively high lower 
Pigging Little   effects Minimum Effects May be relatively 
high effects 
Safety Maximum OK OK  
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Aging/Life Ok OK OK 
Corrosion No  effects Minimum Effects Relatively High eff. 
 
Secondly, if we set test interval test interval greater than one year then what would be 
the effects, in this scenario most important factor which is probability of failure, may 
increase gradually by the passage of time, according to table 3; there would be 
relatively high probability of failure in this case; as compare to other dilemmas. One can 
also observe the probability of failure from the table 4, which shows different parameter 
to observe probability of valve i.e. valve type (including valve design, flow 
characteristics, performance, etc.), failure mode (e.g. leakage across the valve), testing 
method applied (e.g. function close testing with plant shut down, partial stroke testing) 
and age of valve on the time of valve failure. 
Table 4: valve failure (assumed) history 
Valve type Date of 
Failure 
Failure 
Modes  
Testing method 
applied 
Date of Valve 
installation or 
last recondition 
Age at 
Failure 
         x 
        1      
        .      
        .      
        N      
 
When we analyse reliability, in terms of availability of safety critical valve, we can see 
from table 3, there are not so big effects on the equipment. 
As we know land based critical safety valves are installed in corrosive environment, so 
this is also one of the important factor to analyse whether the effects of corrosion is  
‘minimum’ or ‘relatively high’ in each dilemma. In this dilemma (test interval > 1 year) , 
we can say effects related to corrosive would become relatively high. 
Another factor is the maintenance cost, if after analysis we see that the maintenance 
cost is almost same after increasing the test interval, then we can say  there would be 
lower maintenance cost (as a whole) needed ; so it means this factor gives support  to 
increase test interval.  
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Besides other factors , safety is also very important factor, in current practice there are  
no concerns related to safety issues, but if we set test interval less one year; then there 
are chances to have more internal leakage because of more process shut downs; as 
compare to other dilemmas. Safety issues of having test interval greater than one year 
supports longer test interval, in a way that according to [40]:  
Twelve hydrocarbon leaks larger than 0.1 kg/s were reported at the land-based plants in 
2007. However, these were only minor gas escapes, and all the incidents were 
categorised as small fires.   Among other failures related to safety, leakage is the main 
failure mode in these safety critical valves.  According to [23], In onshore plants, 
acceptable leakage rates (see table 5) generally set to higher than for an offshore 
installation, among others;  due to lower human risk exposure etc. Industry experience 
also shows that most valves (>99 of 100) normally satisfy the lower limit requirement 
<0.05 kg/s. It means there would not be high consequences or risk  related to safety 
point of view,  if we increase the test interval as compared to today’s practice.                                         
Table 5: Acceptance criteria for leakage through closed safety critical valves  
Leak rate  [kg/s] Action 
< 0.05  kg/s Acceptable  
0.05  – 1.0  kg/s Perform specific evaluations. Plan for 
repair. 
> 1.0  kg/s Not acceptable - repair 
 
The main advantage of having test interval greater than one year is the reduction in 
maintenance cost and besides that regularity is also one of the most important benefits 
in this scenario. Because not in all plants, testing or inspection work is done during 
turnarounds. there are some plants and facilities, where production may have to be shut 
down for hours because of these tests. In many cases these shut downs are also 
affecting negatively to other installations. Therefore, this is obviously an expensive 
operation. In this scenario due to shut downs, we loose production assurance and 
equipment availability and similarly there is a loss of production and also loss of cost.   
In short by increasing test interval, on the one hand; we can avoid shutdowns/downtime 
and hence can improve regularity and on the other hand we can avoid negative effects 
on the safety level caused by shut down of the process and manual interference into the 
hydrocarbon transport system. 
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According to API Specification 6D ‘‘the purchaser should examine the valve design for 
compatibility with pigging operations when ordering valves for use in pipelines requiring 
pigging.’’ 
From company governing document [23], It is mentioned that events that could change 
the condition of valve are:  
• Pigging  operations  
• Too often testing of function close 
Pigging is now the most widely accepted term for any device which is inserted into a 
pipeline and which travels freely through it, driven by the product flow.  
Pipelines need cleaning to remove fine solids that may have settled from the product as 
it traversed the pipeline. Also, some foreign material such as water may have separated 
from the product and are collected in low points in the pipeline water which can cause 
corrosion so it is important to remove it. Effects of changing the test interval of safety 
critical valves also depends on the periodic pigging operations, because excessive use 
of pigging also damage the valve sealing and valve body and thus cause valve 
degradation. If pigging operations interval decreases, then it could be a advantage for 
valve to avoid scaling, seal damage and hence, improve performance of safety critical 
valve for longer test interval than normal. 
 
Effects of production-loss related to the safety critical valves: 
Production is also a very important factor for changing the test-interval of these valves. 
If  we test valves ‘too often’ , one can see due to process shut down and downtime of 
the processing plant there is large of production loss can be evaluated.  In one 
processing plant , say  production is assumed to be 440 million cubic feet per day, 
which off course is a very large production quantity.. 
According to company interpretations[23], it takes 6 hours to complete testing of valves 
and also cause down time for one day.  
From this, we can calculate the One day production loss by: 
Assume average gas price is 65 NOK (Norwegian krone)  per thousand cubic feet.               
By multiplying gas price with production per day, we get 
One day production loss =  440 x  65 x 1000 = 28,600000 NOK  (28 million and 600000 NOK) 
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Moreover, it is mentioned in company’s internal documents that normally 3 ton gas 
releases during testing of these safety critical valves. Thus, one can say testing too 
often can cause lot of production loss, economic loss and also risk to the other 
equipment connected with valve, and also risk to the environment. 
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6. Case Study   
 
In this chapter, a case study is represented that is related to current industry practice. 
The case study presented is not based upon a real project. However, the decision-
making problems in the case study are representative for a typical Norwegian oil and 
gas plants or facilities. This case study helps putting focus on some practical issues, 
and visualizes the arguments of this thesis title. 
Description: 
Case study is related to Norwegian gas transport system assumed name;  ‘X’ Transport 
and main focus of this ‘X’ is on ‘‘A’’ gas processing plant in Norway. ‘‘Y’’ is the operator 
for the ‘X’ processing plant. This processing plant is assumed to play a key role in the 
transport and treatment of gas and condensate from important areas on the Norwegian 
continental shelf. 
Operator of this plant wants to set the overall maintenance strategy in a way that they 
control maintenance activities so that the company's main business objective is 
achieved in an efficient manner. Following objectives should also be achieved:         
Health, safety and environment (HSE):  
The Processing plant will be operated and held up in a way that eliminate or decrease 
the HSE-related risks for the entire operation.  
Regularity:  
Maintenance of plant is to be managed in such way that ensures the requirements for 
optimal regularity for production and equipment. 
Economy:  
Maintenance is to be done with the best possible utilization of resources, which  prevent 
or limit the equipment failure that lead to production loss or high repair / replacement 
cost. 
Safety Systems:  
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It is indeed essential to prevent accidents in order to achieve the overall goals. 
Therefore safety systems are considered very important in connection with maintenance 
strategy and optimum maintenance strategy is always focused.                                              
In this case study, safety critical valves are used as a main barrier system; these valves 
are also named as emergency shutdown valves (ESDV).  
These critical safety valves are tested once a year, and now operator wants to make 
analysis and evaluation that if one changes the test-interval of these valves then what 
would be the effects on the overall company’s goals and policies. 
 
Discussion 
There are number of factors, one have to consider while analysing and evaluating the 
effects and consequences of changing the test interval of these safety critical valves: 
§ Degradation mechanism 
§ Failure modes 
§ Testing methods 
§ Regularity 
§ Cost of testing  
§ Production effects  
§ Economic aspects 
§ Maintenance issues  (reliability, availability) 
Most of the onshore/off-shore process plants perform periodic scheduling of 
maintenance, which is called preventive maintenance. E.g. valves are taken out for 
service even if no signs of fault are detected. 
 In one case, during a maintenance shutdown about 600 valves were received for 
periodic maintenance. Out of these, only about 30% of them needed repair. For the 
remaining 42 valves it was not necessary to take them out of the plant for maintenance. 
These schedules are deliberately conservative because unscheduled out-ages are 
expensive [14].  
 48
Thus we say optimum maintenance strategy can effects on the changing of the safety 
critical valves 
In addition, it means effects of changing the test interval of these valves can depend on 
selection of maintenance strategy. In this case study, we assumed that condition-
monitoring is used to monitor a state of the machine, using the measuring parameters 
that observes something about the changes in the machine's technical condition. 
Following advantages can be achieved by doing proper condition-monitoring of these 
valves:  
§ May increase test interval instead of periodic scheduling 
§ Lower maintenance costs  
§ Repair equipment in the right time  
§ Reduce repair time  
§ Minimize the degree of future failure rate  
§ Better utilization of equipment / availability  
§ Increased security  
 
 
Degradation mechanism 
The reason that a valve degrades, can often be a combination of several sub causes, 
and can therefore is rather a very complex nature. The combined effects of several 
degradation mechanisms can higher than effects of each individual degradation 
mechanisms. For example combined effects of corrosion and fatigue, and the corrosion 
and wear. These synergy effects can be difficult to explain properly. To predict the 
effects of degradation mechanisms in an environment that is constantly in flux makes it 
even more difficult to predict the effects of the current degradation mechanisms that 
affect the processing plants/facilities.  
When we analyse current degradation mechanism of  these valves with respect to 
changing of the test interval, one can see that safety critical valves in the ‘‘A’’ 
processing plant  are located in corrosive environment. Therefore, it could be possible 
that it gives negative effects to the performance and the reliability of the valve. On the 
other hand if we set test interval less than one year, than one can minimize the 
degradation effects of corrosion, erosion, scaling, dehydration of valve body etc.  
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Failure Modes 
In this case study, we assumed following failure modes connected to safety critical 
valves: 
§ Valve fails to close on demand 
§ Valve fails to close within the specified time 
§ That it leaks 
Among other failures, leakage (see table 6) is the main failure mode in these safety 
critical valves. By changing test interval what will be the effect on leakage, we have 
analyze this leakage acceptance criteria. 
Table 6: Acceptance criteria for leakage through closed valves in process plant ‘‘A’’ 
Leak rate  [kg/s] Action 
< 0.05  kg/s Acceptable  
0.05  – 1.0  kg/s Perform specific evaluations. Plan for 
repair. 
> 1.0  kg/s Not acceptable - repair 
 
According to the company interpretations [23], in onshore plants, acceptable leakage 
rates (see table 6) generally set to higher than for an offshore installation, among others 
due to lower human risk exposure etc. Industry experience also shows that most valves 
(>99 of 100) normally satisfy the lower limit requirement <0.05 kg/s. 
Now if we see [40]; twelve hydrocarbon leaks larger than 0.1 kg/s were reported at the 
land-based plants in 2007. However, these were only minor gas escapes, and all the 
incidents were categorised as small fires.  
From above, one can say that if we set the test interval of safety critical valves greater 
than one year in this processing plant ‘A’ we can achieve many benefits including, 
regularity, reduction in maintenance cost, may avoid damage to valve etc. 
History of Failure events    
Here, one can use the history (assumed) of failure events related to these safety critical 
valves, which can be essential to analyze  the clear picture and  effects of  changing the 
test interval. 
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Table 7: History (Assumed) of failure events related to failure modes of safety critical valves 
Failure Mode   Events 2004 Events 2005 Events 2006 Events 2007 
Valve leaks in the closed position       5    5      3        1 
Valve fails to close on demand         1     2   
Valve fails to close within the 
specified time   
      3     2         1 
External leakage in process liquid         2     2      1        1 
Internal leakage in actuator        1      2      1         2 
 
From table 7, one can evaluate that number of failure events related to those failure 
modes are almost decreasing every year, so this is also the good sign to set the test 
interval of safety critical valves greater than one year. 
Testing Methods  
There are a number of test methods used  in this processing plant ‘’A’’, such as 
measurement of the differential pressure  over the closed valve,  partial stroke testing, 
microphone testing of the  closed valve and microphone testing on open valve. 
According to industry internal document [23]; it is essential that, as possible, a test 
should reflect the intended function in a real situation. For an emergency shutdown 
(ESD) valve, this would normally be complete closing of the valve with the system under 
pressure and in operation. 
The complete/ideal test may sometimes be difficult to perform in practice, because it 
may in itself represent a risk or a direct loss of economic value or can be harmful to the 
environment. So in this case study, one analyse different testing methods (not all) and 
their effect on changing of the test interval. 
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     Table 8: Different ways of testing methods and their effects on changing test interval 
Testing Method Test interval >  1 year  Test interval < 1 year 
Testing with plant shut- 
down 
Less down time 
Improve regularity 
Probability failure may 
increase 
More system shutdowns 
Valve can be damage  
Production loss 
More maintenance cost 
Partial stroke testing Avoid shut-downs 
Not full closure of valve 
Not complete Test 
Not full closure of valve 
Not complete Test 
Microphone testing  Continuous testing  
Could be expensive 
Continuous Testing  
Could be expensive 
 
From table 8, only three types of testing methods are illustrated; these methods have 
some pros and cons like if we test valves too often by testing with plant shut down case, 
we can get benefits in ‘‘A’’ processing plant in term of less number of down times and 
production capacity by improving regularity. This way of doing testing, on the other hand 
may cause high probability of failure as result of corrosion, erosion, wear etc. 
If safety critical valves tested often then, on could have an advantage with partial stroke 
testing, that one can avoid shut-down of the plant, but this test is not considered 
complete since the test does not demonstrate full closure of the valve.  So we can say 
test could not demonstrate all relevant failure mechanisms. 
In the current Oil and Gas industry, some companies wants to increase test interval up 
to 2 years,  for them, Microphone testing or ‘‘lyttetesting’’ could give a strong argument  
and suggestion except that this way of doing testing could be expensive because it 
needs almost continuous testing, we can assume say every 10 seconds. 
Costs associated with the valve-maintenance 
Cost of testing safety critical valves in this processing plant is assumed to be 5 million 
NOK on every year. 
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Table 9:  Cost (assumed) related to testing of safety critical valves. 
Cost Cost of testing if                
test-interval > 1 year 
Cost of testing if                  
test-interval < 1 year 
Cost related to testing to SCV 5 million  NOK 5 million NOK 
 
From Table 9, it shows that if one change the test interval of these valves, then cost of 
testing remain the same. However, In case of increasing test interval there could be 
possibility of some extra maintenance cost due to corrosion, erosion, cavitations, slug 
effects etc.   
 
Effects of production-loss related to the valves 
Production of processing plant ‘A’ is approximately 440 million cubic feet per day, which 
off course is a very large production quantity. Now, through analysis, one can say that if 
we set the test interval less than one year, it could have big effects. 
 In this processing plant it takes 6 hours to complete testing of valves and also cause 
down time for one day.  
From this, we can calculate the One day production loss by: 
Assume average gas price is 65 NOK (Norwegian krone)  per thousand cubic feet.                    
By multiplying  gas price with production per day, we get 
One day production loss = 440 x  65 x 1000 = 28,600000 NOK  (28 million and 
600000 NOK) 
Moreover, normally 3 ton gas releases during testing of these safety critical valves. 
Thus, one can say testing too often can cause lot of production loss, economic loss and 
also risk to the other equipment connected with valve, and also risk to the environment 
as mentioned before, 3 ton gas releases during the testing. 
 
Conclusion  
Sometimes ideal solution is difficult to implement or t o achieve. Effects of changing the 
test interval of safety critical valves in this case study indeed have some advantages 
and also disadvantages in each aspect. The regularity and economical aspects of a 
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processing plant are of most importance, and usually one will have to document that the 
benefit of solutions and efforts is higher than the associated cost.  .The main advantage 
with the use of cost benefit analysis is that it forms basis for prioritizing between 
alternative solutions.. Moreover, many factors relevant to cost, safety, regularity, 
economic aspects, environment, political issues,  etc need to be analyzed and 
evaluated specially benefits generated by different alternatives/activities for the 
company, society and for the individuals. Off course, generating alternatives and 
predicting their burdens and benefits is a basis for good decision making. From above 
case study, one can suggest that, instead of increasing test interval up to one year, if 
we increase the test interval up to six months, which means new test interval would be 
every 18 months. In this way, after evaluating the risk related to safety, health and 
environment, we can achieve optimum regularity, avoid production loss, avoid economic 
loss etc.  
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7. Conclusion 
Testing and maintenance of the valves is carried out in accordance with the 
maintenance programme to increase the probability that the valves are going to fulfil 
their intended functions. 
It is acknowledged that the ability to define what may happen in the future (e.g. what 
can be the effects of changing the test interval), assessment of risk and associated 
uncertainties, and to select best alternative lies at the heart of the risk management 
system. 
We can say that the consequences of weak/fail maintenance programme for safety 
critical valves could be serious. "Too often" testing can lead to unnecessary production 
loss, with major economic consequences, and the danger/risk of test-induced errors. 
"Too less" testing can lead to the valves failure, which in a result could have major 
consequences in relation to safety and long downtime during repairs. 
Of course, generating alternatives and predicting their burdens and benefits is a basis 
for good decision making, but when we have many factors like safety, production 
assurance, economic aspects, and etc. then sometimes ideal solution to the given 
problem is not achieved.  When we talk about effects of changing the test interval of 
land-based safety critical valves, then one should  realise that every scenario 
(increasing  or decreasing or have a current test interval) has both advantages and 
some disadvantages related to safety, regularity, production loss, economic  aspects 
etc.  
Due to different valves (having different performance criteria, capacity rating, flow 
characteristics, response characteristics) use as a safety critical valves (e.g. ball , gate 
and check valve are normally used) different  testing methods (like some needs plant 
shut down, others do not, e.g. partial stroke testing) applied to different safety critical 
valves, different testing criteria applied, so in this situation it is not easy to evaluate  
which testing method is best suitable, which type of safety critical valve to be  best 
suited for different testing methods. As a result it is not easy to find one test-interval 
which is most appropriate in connection with related effects. 
In the end, there should be a detailed study regarding selection of valves, individual 
evaluation of each testing method for certain categories of safety critical valves and 
testing criteria needs to be deeply analyzed and evaluated for future research on this 
problem. 
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